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most noteworthy statement of the subjective theory of knowledge, he can perhaps no longer be considered to be quite such an innovator in philosophy.

Burthogge's later work of 1694 is clearly and confessedly dependent upon Locke to whom he dedicated the essay. The subjective epistemology of the earlier work is restated more in Lockian fashion, though Burthogge maintains one point in which he differed from Locke, namely the activity of the mind in sensation (76-77). Attempts to describe the nature of substance are, however, made by Burthogge in this work, as by Locke in the *Essay*, though they were not made in the earlier work of 1678 and are obviously inconsistent with the epistemological position already adopted. For example, the substance of water is supposed to consist in itself of "little parts" of a certain magnitude and size, figure and shape, kind and motion, even though exact knowledge thereof is impossible (83-87); that is, water is treated as an atomist would treat it, as possessing objectively what Locke called the primary qualities. Again, two kinds of substance, matter and mind, are regarded as proved from the two different kinds of effects which they arouse in the mind of one who perceives them (91). Or again, Descartes's resolution of corporeal substance into "mere" extension is rejected, and matter is treated as a substance which has extension as an attribute (96). Still again, the whole physiological explanation of sensations as due to impressions coming in through the end-organs from an external world is adopted quite realistically (127). Thus Burthogge under Locke's influence departs from idealism towards dualism, and takes a stand in his metaphysics which is utterly unwarranted by his theory of knowledge. Such influence may be regarded as unfortunate; but it is none the less real. No problem remains unsolved in connection with this later work as in the case in the relation of Burthogge's earlier work to Locke's *Essay*.

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Nietzsche, sa Vie et sa Pensée: Vol. II. La Jeunesse de Nietzsche jusqu'à la Rupture avec Bayreuth. CHARLES ANDLER. Paris: Editions Bossard. 1921. Pp. 469.

It would be unfair to readers of the JOURNAL were a lengthy delay in review of these volumes (Vol. III is before me also) to result from very recent changes in the personal plans of the reviewer. Seeing that this would be inevitable were full review in question, and that, as in the case of Volume I (*cf.* this JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 1921), such review must needs await completion of the work, I submit some account of M. Andler's progress, *pour servir*.

Volume II contains an Introduction, and three Books—the “Shaping of Nietzsche”; the “Preparation for the Book on Tragedy”; the “Attempt to Reform Wagnerism.” But these titles offer little indication of the variety and suggestiveness of the contents.

The Introduction gives Andler an opportunity to state his manner of approach, and to issue a warning about the two Nietzsche “traditions”—that of Wiemar and that of Basle—lions in the path. Book I consists of two chapters; on “Forebears and Adolescence,” and the “University and the Influence of O. Ritschl” respectively. The pictures of Saxon culture, of the Lutheran rural clergy (reminding one forcibly of Scotland), and of the unique school at Pforta, are admirably drawn. There is a splendid pen-portrait of Ritschl. It affords an illuminating clue to the humanistic German “man of science” in the mid-nineteenth century—the zeal of thine house hath eaten me up. Book II opens with an equally informing presentation of social and cultural conditions at Basle when Nietzsche arrived upon the scene; a town with a distinctive atmosphere of its own, like so many Teutonic centers from of old—Francke’s Halle, Kant’s Königsberg, Goethe’s Weimar, Schelling’s Jena, for example. Follows a charming account of the “Idyl of Tribschen”—Nietzsche in the bosom of Wagner domesticity. Chapter I concludes with the events attendant upon the war of 1870, and I am glad to see that Andler treats Nietzsche’s physical mischance as an incident. Chapter II describes Nietzsche’s intercourse with five intimate friends—Paul Deussen, Heinrich Romundt, Carl von Gersdorff, Erwin Rohde, and Franz Overbeck—saying something about repercussions; and stresses the influence of the family circle, making some pointed remarks on the sister, now famous, thanks to the brother’s reflected glory, but not always to be taken, for this mere accident, *au pied de la lettre*. Chapter III is devoted to an intensive account of the intimate soul-relations between Nietzsche and Wagner, in which Andler takes care to hint (Sect. ii) the subtle part played by Cosima Wagner, the “Corinne-Ariane” of the *Empedocles* Fragment. Some reading between the lines is necessary here; but section i of Chapter V (“The Foundation of Bayreuth,” some 70 pp. later) serves to make matters plainer. Chapter IV is specially noteworthy for its analysis of the sources of the *Birth of Tragedy*—in the Romanics (Fr. and W. Schlegel, and Fr. Creuzer), in O. Müller, Fr. Welcker, J. J. Bachofen, and Fr. Liszt. The summary (pp. 272 f.) points the moral well (*cf.* pp. 289 f.). As just indicated, chapter V, concluding Book II, pictures Tribschen at its warmest; an exhibition (the most intimate among not a few) of German *Schwärmerei*

nigh incredible to the phlegmatic (and barbarous!) Anglo-Saxon. In short, Romanticism rampageous, ante-Bismarck *Kultur in excelsis!*

Book III raises issues even more interesting. We see Nietzsche just beginning to free himself, and to sense problems destined to return for judgment till the last. Chapter I deals with "Nietzsche's First Scientific Studies"—not *Wissenschaft*, but natural science. The physicists Boscovich, Pouillet, and Mohr, the chemists Kopp and Landenberg, and the cosmologist Maedler, furnished much food for thought. But the main spell seems to have been exerted by J. K. F. Zöllner, the Leipzig astronomer, who attacked his fellow physicists much as Nietzsche had attacked his fellow philologists; and who met a similar reception—witness Wilamowitz's famous or infamous *Zukunftphilologie* (pp. 291 f.). His "scandalous" book, *Über die Natur Kometen*, a contribution rather to the literature of panpsychism than of astronomy, posed the question of the "unconscious," then clamant. It jumbled the terminology of physics and psychology, transforming facts observed in the bodily order into experiences of the soul, making possible a reversion to pythagoreanism (pp. 318–20). Although Zöllner essayed to explain the rise of industry and of science, together with the reasons for social decadence, he forgot the office of art, dear to Nietzsche, because with art lay the potency of the future. In fine, Nietzsche's contact with physical science rendered it necessary for him to expand Wagnerism rationally. Nor was he to stop at physics and chemistry.

Darwin's *fermentum cognitionis*, known to Nietzsche through the several reactions of F. A. Lange, Oscar Schmidt, and Nägeli, involved other issues. At this juncture, personal contact with L. Rütimeyer, the paleontologist, professor of zoölogy and comparative anatomy at Basle, a "philosophical spirit" in a day when the riches of observation and experiment had atrophied generalization (p. 332), exerted decisive influence, causing Nietzsche to substitute for the individualistic struggle for existence a genetic, and neo-lamarckian, *élan vitale*. This "prime vital energy" may portend much, mayhap even the birth of a supreme race. For, as Rütimeyer had the hardihood to suggest, "*Notre squelette porte en lui les possibilités d'une evolution ultérieure, autant que toute autre forme du squelette vertébré*" (p. 343). Hence Nietzsche's preoccupation thus early with the possibility of an ascent to a higher type of humanity. Here, then, is a mystic positivism and, to the extent of its mysticism, it demands a reckoning with religion.

Accordingly, chapter II deals with the "unseasonable" essay on D. F. Strauss. The friendship with that "*vieille fille fanatisée*"

(p. 352), the pontificating *bas-bleu*, Malwida von Meysenbug; the marked influence of the views of Paul de Lagarde (Göttingen) about Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism; and of Franz Overbeck's *Über die Christlichkeit der heutigen Theologie* (p. 368 f.) added to the ferment. As Nietzsche saw things now, Cosima Wagner threatened to corrupt her husband, Strauss to corrupt the German people—the one by reactionary faith, the other by equally reactionary science. So Nietzsche agonizes. The tract on *History* results and, with that on *Schopenhauer as Educator*, he passes beyond Wagnerism, to begin the "Renaissance of tragic philosophy in Germany" (p. 416). Wagner must be constrained to reconstruct his universe of values, or a final break can not be averted. Chapter IV diagnoses the symptoms which led to the break, and brought Nietzsche's "*L'affranchissement*" (the title of the chapter). Suffice it to say that association with Jacob Burckhardt, another member of the stimulating circle at Basle, supplied a decisive factor. The volume closes with a brief appendix on Nietzsche's philological writings, exploited recently by Ernst Howald in his *Friedrich Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie* (1920).

It were superfluous to praise Andler's breadth of knowledge, presented with the unique talent of his people for clear and crisp exposition. The book marks another step in an indispensable guide to Nietzsche's Odyssey of the spirit. Similar review of Volume III will follow soon.

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The Psychology of Everyday Life. Pp. ix + 164. *The Psychology of Industry*. Pp. xi + 148. JAMES DREVER. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1921.

These two books are written for the general reader in that happy popular style which is the peculiar gift of the British and the despair of Continental writers. Here and there a striking expression makes a scientific fact stand out with the vividness of a poetic phrase, as, *e.g.*, "Experience is itself living." "The world of make-believe is a self-created world."

In the first volume nearly all the major points of modern psychology have been touched upon, though rather lightly it must be confessed. His treatment of the emotional life is rather better than that of some other subjects and he seems particularly fortunate in his application of the psychological theories of Freud to this phase of conscious life. The motive in writing the book is the belief, "that for all those arts and sciences which are concerned with the human factor in the world process in any of its phases the science